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Here, we demonstrate that a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol relying
on the Gaussian modulation of coherent states features secret key rates that cannot be achieved with standard
qubit discrete-variable QKD protocols. Notably, we report a practical postprocessing that allows us to extract
more than 1 bit of secret key per channel use.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] has been the most
studied quantum information technology primitive for the past
twenty years. In a practical QKD protocol, Alice and Bob can
extract an arbitrary amount of secret key using an untrusted
physical channel (also called a quantum channel), provided a
few minimum assumptions such as they have access to a public
authenticated channel. Contrary to classical cryptographic
primitives whose security can be established only against some
restrictive classes of eavesdroppers, QKD keys are secure in
the information-theoretic sense even against an eavesdropper
with unlimited computational resources or with undisclosed
cryptanalytic knowledge.
In discrete-variable (DV) QKD protocols, the information
is encoded on discrete values, such as the phase or the
polarization of single photons, and detection is done using
single-photon detectors. Continuous-variable (CV) QKD pro-
tocols employ continuous or discrete modulations [2] of the
quadratures of the electromagnetic field. CVQKD setups rely
on a coherent detection (homodyne or heterodyne) between
the quantum signal and a classical reference signal called
the local oscillator, and their implementation requires only
standard telecom components. They are compatible with
wavelength division multiplexing [3], which greatly eases
their deployment into telecommunication networks. In the
early history of CVQKD, this technology was expected to
achieve higher secret key rates than DVQKD protocols thanks
to the possibility of encoding more than 1 bit per pulse.
However, the secure distance of the most common CVQKD
protocol [4], which consists of a Gaussian modulation of
coherent states in the phase space and a homodyne detection
of any of two orthogonal quadratures of the field at random,
was limited to 25 km [5] for a long time because of the lack
of efficient error correction procedures at low signal-to-noise
ratios. This problem was solved thanks to the multidimensional
reconciliation technique proposed in [6] together with the
design of high-efficiency error correcting codes in [7] and
significantly extended the secure distance of CVQKD to about
80 km [8]. However, multidimensional protocols are limited
to 1 bit per pulse.
In this paper, we exhibit high-efficiency error correct-
ing codes for the additive white Gaussian noise channel
(AWGNC). In the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, it
allows us to go beyond previous achievable secret key rates [8]
with CVQKD systems and extract more than 1 bit of secret key
per channel use, a rate impossible to attain, even in principle,
with qubit DVQKD systems.
In Sec. II, we explain the links between the secret key
rate and error correction in CVQKD and review previous
work on error correction for both DVQKD and CVQKD.
In Sec. III we detail the principle of slice reconciliation,
which is a technique that can be used to reconcile nonbinary
elements, and study its practical performance in the specific
case of the distribution of Gaussian elements. Finally, we show
in Sec. IV the consequences of these developments on the
performance of the Gaussian protocol over short distances
with a state-of-the-art CVQKD system and make projections
about future achievable secret key rates.
II. ERROR CORRECTION WITH CONTINUOUS
VARIABLES
A. Secret key rate and error correction
In any QKD protocol (either DV or CV), after some
quantum states are exchanged on a quantum channel, an
error correction mechanism is used to make Alice and Bob
share some common data. There are two usual cases: either
Bob corrects its errors with respect to Alice in the direct
reconciliation scenario or Alice corrects its errors with respect
to Bob in the reverse reconciliation scenario. In these two
cases, the party performing error correction does so using
additional data revealed by the other party through a noiseless,
classical channel.
The final secret key size generated by a QKD experiment
therefore depends on three quantities: the raw common data
after error correction, the amount of information that was
revealed during the error correction phase, and an upper
estimate of the amount of information gained by the attacker
through its interaction with the quantum channel. The latter
quantity is a result of the security proof of the considered
protocol and is the information that the attacker Eve has
in common with Alice in the direct reconciliation case and
with Bob in the reverse reconciliation case. In the case of
CVQKD, the measurement of information used is the Holevo
information and the direct (reverse) quantities are denoted by
χAE (χBE). The relevant quantity to take into account for the
amount of information revealed because of error correction is
the mutual (Shannon) information between Alice and Bob,
IAB. A perfect error correction scheme is able to retrieve
all of IAB; that is, the amount of common information after
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error correction subtracted from the amount of auxiliary data
revealed to perform the error correction is equal to IAB; a
practical scheme will extract only an amount of information
βIAB with β < 1. Overall, the final amount of secret key
produced by a QKD protocol is βIAB − χAE with direct
reconciliation and βIAB − χBE with reverse reconciliation.
In the case of Gaussian modulated coherent-state
CVQKD [4], the channel parameters enabling us to bound
the information obtained by Eve are the line transmission T
and the noise added by Eve on the quantum channel or excess
noise ξ . When there is no excess noise, one has for any line
transmission T , χBE < IAB: some secret key can be produced
at any distance using reverse reconciliation with a perfect
error correction scheme or a “sufficiently good” scheme such
that βIAB − χBE > 0. Using direct reconciliation, however,
χAE < IAB only when losses are lower than 3 dB (T > 0.5);
therefore a direct reconciliation scheme can be used only for
short distances.
In coherent-state Gaussian CVQKD [4], the error correction
schemes used also depend on the SNR of the data to correct.
For this protocol, the error correction scenario is a bit unusual
since both the signal and the noise are Gaussian, which is not
a well-studied scenario outside the field of QKD. The error
correction must also be paired with an algorithm to extract
identical bits out of highly correlated Gaussian values. The
efficiency factor β is typically highly sensitive to the SNR of
the system; historical CVQKD systems used reasonably high
SNRs because of this. The coherent-state Gaussian protocol
is the CVQKD protocol whose security has been studied the
most because it features higher secret key rates than protocols
that employ discrete modulations and can be implemented with
standard components in contrast to squeezed-state protocols.
However, in contrast to DVQKD, specific error correction
techniques need to be designed to deal with nonbinary key
elements. Furthermore, the error correction schemes used also
depend on the SNR of the data to correct.
B. Previous work
The first reconciliation protocols were ad hoc constructions
targeting DVQKD. Among these early proposals, Cascade [9]
stands out as a very simple protocol with reasonably high
efficiency. Its principal defect is that it is extremely interactive.
However, a recent implementation of Cascade [10] shows that,
provided that a dedicated classical communications line is
available, a high throughput is achievable.
In contrast to these protocols, most recent work in DVQKD
has focused in applying capacity-approaching one-way error
correcting codes for reconciliation. For instance, large length
(106) low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes can be used to
approach the theoretical limits [11]. These results only hold
for large lengths; recently explicit fundamental one-way limits
have been stressed in [12] as a function of the length and
the target frame error rate (FER). However, a combination
of error correcting codes with a few rounds of interactivity
allows us to bypass these limitations while maintaining a high
throughput [13].
As regards CVQKD, specific error correction techniques
need to be designed to deal with nonbinary key elements.
In [14], slice error correction (SEC) was proposed to extract
mutual information out of any correlated variables, either
discrete or continuous. SEC uses interactive error correcting
codes whose efficiency is suboptimal as pointed out in [15].
Multilevel coding and multistage decoding (MLC and MSD)
are standard coded modulation techniques that were applied
to CVQKD reconciliation in [5,15]. They feature higher
efficiency than SEC for SNR between 1 and 15 but their
efficiency drops quickly for SNR below 3. In CVQKD,
achieving long distances requires us to maintain a high
reconciliation efficiency for low SNRs. This is why the secure
distance was limited to 25 km [5] until the multidimensional
reconciliation scheme was proposed in [6]. This scheme
encodes the information in binary variables, which allows us
to deal with a binary input (BI) AWGNC instead of the usual
AWGNC. Since low-rate high-efficiency multiedge LDPC
codes can be designed for this channel [7], the achievable
secure distance for CVQKD with a Gaussian modulation can
be considerably extended. In [6], high efficiency with a SNR
of 0.5 allowed us to extend the secure distance to about 50 km
while LDPC codes specifically designed for SNRs as low as
0.03 [7] were used to demonstrate the exchange of secure keys
at 80 km [8]. Finally, since achieving high efficiencies requires
intensive iterative decoding for LDPC codes, the use of graphic
processing units (GPUs) [5,16] for LDPC decoding and the
use of polar codes [16] which feature a high speed decoder on
central processing units (CPUs) have been investigated.
III. SLICE RECONCILIATION
A. Principle
Slice reconciliation was introduced in [14] as a reconcilia-
tion scheme for nonbinary sources using binary error correct-
ing codes. It works in two steps (see Fig. 1 for a schematic
description of the protocol). The first step consists of choosing
a set of m slice functions S1,..Sm : R→ {0,1} that take the
source to binary values. Together the m functions can be
regarded as a quantizing function Q : R→ {0,1}m that trans-
forms the continuous Gaussian source into an m-bit source.
However, by the data processing inequality, I (Q(X); Y ) 
I (X; Y ) [or equivalently I (X; Q(Y ))  I (X; Y ) for Reverse
Reconciliation (RR)]. That is, there is an inherent inefficiency
associated with the discretization of the source. For any fixed
number of bits m we can optimize the secret key rate by
finding the function that maximizes I (Q(X); Y ) [I (X; Q(Y ))
for RR]. This problem of designing a discretization function
that maximizes a mutual information criterion was described
in [17].
We consider here two different slice constructions (see
Fig. 2). Both of them divide the real line into 2m disjoint
intervals and take the Gaussian source to the (m bit) index
of the interval. In the first slice construction the intervals are
defined by 2m − 1 equally spaced points. Finding the function
that maximizes the mutual information reduces to optimizing
over a single degree of freedom. We report in Fig. 3 the
evolution of the value of the constant step giving the best
quantization efficiency with respect to the SNR for m = 3 to
5. The second construction chooses freely the 2m intervals.
In this case, finding the optimal function is an optimization
problem with 2m − 1 degrees of freedom. We can see in Fig. 4
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FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the slice protocol for direct reconciliation. First the input source is quantized into an m-bit source. Then
each of the m sources is encoded and sent to Bob. In the figure the first slice is transmitted unencoded. The decoder takes as side information
its own source and with the m encoded sources produces an estimate of the quantized source.
that this more complex construction does not improve much
the quantization efficiency obtained with the first construction.
This is why we used the first construction in practice to obtain
the reconciliation efficiencies reported in Table I.
The second step deals with sending an encoding of Q(X)
to Bob [Q(Y ) to Alice in RR] such that he can infer Q(X)
[Q(Y ) in RR] with high probability. This is a problem that
can be readily tackled with coding techniques. In particular,
slice reconciliation uses a multilevel coding scheme [15]. Each
of the m slices is encoded independently as the syndrome
of an error correcting code with rate Ri (1  i  m). If
the information rates are chosen appropriately the decoder
can recover each of the slices using its own source as side
information. The rate of the encoding is upper bounded by the
capacity of the associated channel. However, this bound can
only be reached in the limit of asymptotically large codes; in
consequence the use of real, finite-length codes introduces
a second source of inefficiency. The efficiency β of slice
reconciliation is given by
β = H [Q(X)] − m +
∑m
i=1 Ri
I (X; Y ) . (1)
Equation (1) shows that β is highly dependent on the rates
of the available codes and how close they are to the channel
capacities. For this reason we have chosen LDPC codes, well
known for operating close to the capacity of symmetric binary
input channels. The procedure is well known; for each rate the
space of ensembles of codes is explored with an evolutionary
FIG. 2. Two examples of quantizers dividing the real line in 23
intervals. The figure on the top shows a quantizer with constant step;
the figure on the bottom shows a quantizer with optimized interval
length.
algorithm [18] and for each ensemble the asymptotic behavior
of the codes belonging to the ensemble can be evaluated with
the density evolution algorithm [19]. The evolution of the value
of the optimal rates for each slice with respect to the SNR for
an optimal discretization of the real line into regular intervals
is given in Fig. 5. In practice, once the number of slices is fixed,
for a given SNR we use Fig. 3 to choose the optimal quanti-
zation step and Fig. 5 to choose the optimal rates of the codes
we need to design in order to decode the successive slices.
With optimal codes, the efficiency βdisc of the discretization
scheme is
βdisc = H [Q(X)] − m +
∑m
i=1 Ci
I (X; Y ) , (2)
where Ci is the capacity of the channel corresponding to the
ith discretization layer. Assuming codes of efficiency βc < 1
FIG. 3. (Color online) Evolution of the value of the constant step
giving the best quantization efficiency with respect to the SNR. The
solid red line corresponds to 3 slices (8 intervals), the dashed green
line corresponds to 4 slices (16 intervals), and the dotted blue line
corresponds to 5 slices (32 intervals).
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Optimal quantization efficiency with re-
spect to the SNR for a discretization of the real line into regular
intervals (solid lines) and nonregular intervals (dashed lines). Red
lines give the discretization efficiency for 3 slices (8 intervals), green
lines give it for 4 slices (16 intervals), and blue lines give it for 5
slices (32 intervals).
are used, the efficiency of the overall scheme is
β = H [Q(X)] − m +
∑m
i=1 βcCi
I (X; Y )
= βdisc − (1 − βc)γ, (3)
with
γ =
∑m
i=1 Ci
I (X; Y ) . (4)
The quantity γ therefore controls the relationship between
the lack of efficiency of individual error correcting codes used
and the efficiency loss that it causes on the slice reconciliation
scheme. Because H [Q(X)]  m, when βdisc is close to 1, γ >
1. Typical values of γ are between 1 and 2 as shown in Fig. 6.
B. Simulation results
An optimization on the bounds of the discretization Q(X)
shows the following basic facts. For a fixed SNR, the
higher the number of layers, the lower the discretization loss
I (X; Y ) − I (Q(X); Y ). It is always possible to make this loss
TABLE I. The first two columns show the efficiencies achieved
with slice reconciliation with respect to the SNR. The last two
columns show the efficiencies achieved with multiedge LDPC codes
with respect to the SNR; these values were reported in [7].
AWGN BIAWGN
SNR Efficiency SNR Efficiency
0.55 93.4% 0.0075 95.9%
0.86 93.7% 0.0145 96.6%
1 94.2% 0.029 96.9%
3 94.1% 0.075 95.8%
5.12 94.4% 0.161 93.1%
14.57 95.8% 1.097 93.6%
66.10 94.8%
FIG. 5. (Color online) Evolution of the value of the optimal rates
for each slice with respect to the SNR for an optimal discretization
of the real line into regular intervals. The lowest plots correspond to
the least significant bits, which are the noisiest bits. Solid red lines
correspond to three slices, dashed green lines correspond to four
slices, and dotted blue lines correspond to five slices.
negligible by increasing the number of layers. This implies
that γ increases and can become much larger than 1 as shown
in Fig. 6. As seen in Eq. (3), this means that adding layers
requires error correcting codes closer to the Shannon limit to
minimize the loss on the scheme caused by the inefficiency of
the individual codes. Overall, with codes having βc  95%,
the five-slice scheme is the best on the SNR range 0.5–15 and
is always above 90% efficiency, as shown in Fig. 7, thanks to its
high quantization efficiency (see Fig. 4) and despite its higher
γ value at low SNR. This is much better than results of [5],
where an efficiency above 90% could only be obtained for
SNRs above 7. This is mainly due to the fact that we designed
specific codes to decode each slice. Furthermore we perform
error correction with codes of large length (220).
As a summary, we show in the first two columns of
Table I the best efficiencies obtained with slice reconciliation
optimizing over the number of slices and the quantization step.
γ
FIG. 6. (Color online) Factor γ as defined in Eq. (4) indicating
the sensitivity of slice reconciliation to the suboptimality of the error
correcting codes used for three, four, and five slices.
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β
FIG. 7. (Color online) Overall efficiency of slice reconciliation
with error correcting codes of efficiency βc = 95% for three, four,
and five slices.
In the last two columns we show the efficiencies reported in [7]
with codes for the Binary Input Additive White Gaussian Noise
Channel (BIAWGNC).
For SNRs below 0.5, the multidimensional methods of [7]
are more competitive than slice reconciliation. Indeed, in that
case, I (X,Y )  1, and the main limitation of multidimen-
sional methods that they can only extract 1 bit per pulse is
not a problem. Therefore the combination of multidimensional
methods and slice reconciliation with up to five slices yields an
efficiency above 90% for SNRs ranging from 0.01 to 100. For
SNRs above 10, the capacity of the highest layer is sufficiently
close to 1 to be able to use a simple, fast, hard decoding
code such as a Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH) code to
decode it. As an alternative, it is always possible to use a code
in a regime of higher SNR than its initial threshold SNR. In
this case the following efficiency can be obtained:
βs = βs0
log2(1 + s0)
log2(1 + s)
, (5)
where s and βs denote the target SNR and s0andβs0 denote the
original SNR and efficiency.1
At the other end of the spectrum, low-rate slices are decoded
with multiedge LDPC codes, which can have an efficiency
above 95% for rates 0.1–0.02 [7]. For even lower rates,
multiedge LDPC codes can be combined with a length k
repetition code without a significant efficiency loss [20]:
βs = βs0
s log2(1 + s0)
s0 log2(1 + s)
≈
s0≈0
1, (6)
where s = s0/k. Alternatively, the slices can be fully revealed.
Revealing a lower slice is not equivalent to reducing the
number of slices, since the knowledge of the lowest slices
helps the soft decoding of the upper slices.
1Let R be the rate of a binary code that is used for reconciliation
with s0 as SNR; then βs0 = R/ log2(1 + s0). The same code can be
used for reconciliation with a lower amount of noise; in this case
the efficiency is simply given by βs = R/ log2(1 + s) = βs0 log2(1 +
s0)/ log2(1 + s).
IV. APPLICATION TO HIGH-BIT-RATE CVQKD
For all our simulations, we have computed the secret key
rate against collective attacks [21,22], which is equivalent to
the secret key rate against general attacks in the limit of large
block lengths. When considering finite-size effects [23,24],
the performance of reconciliation is not affected but the
modulation variance that yields the optimal key rate is different
than in the asymptotic case; the secret key rate is also lower in
this scenario than in the asymptotic one at any distance, partly
because the estimated value of the excess noise is increased
to take into account the statistical uncertainty of the estimator.
The secret key rate greatly varies between the direct and reverse
reconciliation scenarios. In Fig. 8 we plot both scenarios with
parameters ξ = 0.0015VA,α = 0.2, where VA is the variance
of Alice’s input signal and ideal measurement devices and α
is the loss coefficient of the optical fiber. For distances shorter
than 2 km, Direct Reconciliation (DR) is a better option but
the curve drops sharply and reaches zero before 15 km, which
corresponds to the DR limit of 3 dB. RR on the other hand
has no theoretical limitation and with the chosen parameters
at 100 km still yields a secret key rate close to 5 × 10−3 bits
per symbol. These secret key rates are the maximized rates
over the variance of Alice’s input signal. The corresponding
SNR values are plotted with the same pattern and color as
the corresponding secret key rate with smaller width. The
remaining figures in this section follow the same convention.
The optimization of the quantization step allows us to
increase the secret key rate in the short distance regime. This is
particularly noticeable in the DR scenario. In Fig. 9 we show
the achievable secret key rate with ideal measurement devices.
We have chosen three scenarios for comparison: (1) imperfect
detection devices and perfect reconciliation, (2) slice recon-
ciliation, and (3) reconciliation over a BIAWGN of the same
SNR (the limit case of the multidimensional channels [7]). The
four curves run separated over the whole region considered;
the main reason is that the optimal VA values correspond to
high SNR values (plotted in the same curve), which translates
into an advantage for slice reconciliation. We would like to
highlight that for very short distances slice reconciliation
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Comparison of the RR (dashed) and DR
(solid) secret key rate with ideal measurement devices. The thick lines
show secret key rate, the thin lines the optimal SNR which is equal to
VA/T up to some small excess noise related term. The secret key rate
of the first four km is zoomed in the upper right corner. Parameters:
α = 0.2,ξ = 0.0015VA.
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Secret key rate in the DR scenario. From
top to bottom the curves show the secret key rate with: ideal
measurement devices (solid), realistic devices characterized by a
finite detection efficiency η and an electronic noise velec (dashed),
slice reconciliation (dotted) and reconciliation over a BIAWGN
(dashed-dotted). The thick lines show secret key rate, the thin lines
the optimal SNR which is a function of the input signal variance.
Parameters: ξ = 0.0015VA,α = 0.2,η = 0.6,velec = 0.01.
allows us to distill for the first time more than one secret
bit per channel use.
In the reverse reconciliation scenario the advantage of our
implementation of slice reconciliation is limited to distances
below 13 km. The reason lies in the increasing difficulty
of optimizing multilevel coding schemes for low SNRs.
Furthermore, binary encodings are optimal in the low SNR
regime. The reason is that the capacity of the associated
channel, the BIAWGN, converges to the capacity of the AWGN
channel as the SNR goes to zero. In fact, binary encodings
have successfully been used for long distance CVQKD [6].
We observe this behavior in Fig. 10: below 13 km there is an
advantage in using slice reconciliation, but over this distance
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Secret key rate in the RR scenario. From
top to bottom the curves show the secret key rate with: ideal
measurement devices (solid), realistic devices characterized by a
finite detection efficiency η and an electronic noise velec (dashed),
slice reconciliation (dotted) and reconciliation over a BIAWGN
(dashed-dotted). The thick lines show secret key rate, the thin lines
the optimal SNR which is a function of the input signal variance. The
secret key rate of the first twenty km is zoomed in at the upper right
corner. Parameters: ξ = 0.0015VA,α = 0.2,η = 0.6,velec = 0.01.
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FIG. 11. (Color online) Secret key rate in the RR scenario with a
heterodyne detection and the security proof of [25]. The solid lines
show the asymptotic secret key rate, the dashed lines show the secret
key rate with finite blocks of length n = 109. From top to bottom
the upper solid and upper dashed curves show the secret key rate for
realistic devices characterized by a detection efficiency η = 0.85 and
the lower solid and lower dashed curves for a detection efficiency
η = 0.6. We consider here the paranoid mode where the noise added
by the detection can be manipulated by the attacker. Other parameters:
ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, block size n = 109, electronic noise velec =
0.001 and security parameter  = 10−10.
binary encodings lead and allow us to distill the secret key
over large distances [7].
We used the experimental system reported in [8] and
operated it in the high SNR regime for very low losses between
Alice and Bob. For a SNR of 19 and a line transmission of
0.995, we obtained an excess noise of 0.03 shot-noise units
(SNUs) on Bob’s side, i.e., an excess noise of 0.05 SNU on
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FIG. 12. (Color online) Secret key rate in the RR scenario with
a heterodyne detection and the security proof of [25]. The figure
shows the secret key rate with respect to the detection efficiency.
From top to bottom the upper curve shows the secret key rate in the
asymptotic regime and the lower curve shows the secret key in the
finite key scenario. We consider here the paranoid mode where the
noise added by the detection can be manipulated by the attacker. Other
parameters: electronic noise velec = 0.001, distance d = 0.1 km,
ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, block size n = 1010 and security parameter
 = 10−10.
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TABLE II. Comparison of CVQKD and DVQKD. For CVQKD, the figures are obtained using the security proof of [25] as in Fig. 11.
Rate Throughput
CVQKDa Ratioa,c CVQKDb Ratiob,c DVQKDc 1 MHza 50 MHzb 1 GHzc
100 m 2.7 × 10−1 17 6.0 ×10−1 39 1.5 × 10−2 2.7 × 105 3.0 × 107 1.5 × 107
10 km 1.1 × 10−1 12 2.2 × 10−1 23 9.5 × 10−3 1.1 × 105 1.1 × 107 9.5 × 106
30 km 9.0 × 10−3 2 3.2 × 10−2 9 3.6 × 10−3 9.0 × 103 1.6 × 107 3.6 × 106
40 km 3.7 × 10−3 2 2.2 × 10−3 1.8 × 105 2.2 × 106
aA realistic setting characterized by an electronic noise velec = 0.001, a detection efficiency η = 0.6, and a 1-MHz repetition rate [8].
bAn optimistic setting characterized by an electronic noise velec = 0.001, a detection efficiency η = 0.85, and a 50-MHz repetition rate.
cThe DVQKD data reported in [26].
Alice’s side for a measured homodyne detection efficiency
of 0.6 and an electronic noise of 0.01 SNU. We obtained
a practical reconciliation efficiency of 95% and the secret
key rate per pulse is about 1.02 in the reverse reconciliation
scenario, while it reaches 1.04 in the direct reconciliation
scenario. These measurements confirm the possibility to
extract more than one secret bit per pulse with a CVQKD
system.
We investigated the robustness of these results in the
composable security framework presented in [25]. In the same
way as our previous simulations, we optimized the secret key
rate with respect to the reconciliation efficiency and considered
both direct and reverse reconciliation scenarios with imperfect
devices. However, we considered the heterodyne protocol, as
described in [25], in the paranoid mode where the imperfec-
tions of the detector are assumed to be controlled by Eve and
in the limit of finite-length data blocks. This corresponds to the
most secure known scenario and as expected the secret key rate
is lower than in our previous simulations as shown in Fig. 11.
With a heterodyne detection characterized by an efficiency
η = 0.6 and an electronic noise velec = 0.01, the secret key
rate vanishes at about 30 km. This is why we plot in Fig. 11 the
secret key rate in both the finite key and the asymptotic scenario
for realistic improvements of the heterodyne detection. All
the curves are plotted with an electronic noise velec = 0.001,
which is achievable with cooled heterodyne detections. With
a heterodyne detection efficiency of 60% a secure distance of
about 35 km can be achieved in the finite key scenario while an
improved heterodyne detection efficiency of 85% would allow
us to exchange keys at about 80 km but in the asymptotic
limit. One can see that the secret key rate drops below 1 bit
per symbol with a heterodyne detection efficiency of 60%. We
show in Fig. 12 that it is still possible to exchange secret keys
with a rate higher than 1 bit per symbol at short distance (0.1
km) even in the paranoid mode and using finite data blocks but
at the expense of improving the detection efficiency to about
91% and using data blocks of size 1010.
In Table II we compare a recent DVQKD experiment
yielding high secret key throughput [26] with the two CVQKD
scenarios depicted in Fig. 11. Columns 2 and 4 correspond to
the secret key rate per signal, while columns 7–9 correspond to
secret key throughputs. Columns 3 and 5, respectively, give the
ratios between columns 2 and 6 and between columns 4 and 6.
In order to get a throughput figure, we multiply the secret key
rates by the corresponding clock rate. Column 7 corresponds
to a clock rate of 1 MHz as reported in [8], while column 8
reports the expected throughput for a reasonable improvement
of the clock rate to 50 MHz.
On the hardware side, increasing the clock rate to about
50 MHz is not significant: high-bandwidth optical modulators
and acquisition cards are commercially available while homo-
dyne detections running at a few hundred MHz have already
been reported [27]. As regards the postprocessing, privacy
amplification can be done at a few hundred MHz on one core of
a modern CPU but high-efficiency error correction as described
in this paper would require at least one modern GPU and
probably two. More generally, when dealing with continuous
values at such speeds, every step, such as random numbers
generation and network communication, must be implemented
carefully.
V. CONCLUSION
We have optimized the performance of practical reconcil-
iation schemes for CVQKD, and the resulting schemes have
above 90% efficiency for any SNR, which leads to higher key
rates than those reported in past CVQKD experiments [8].
Notably, for distances below 100 m, more than 1 bit per
symbol can be distilled. The expected throughput with a
CVQKD clock rate of 1 MHz, as reported in [8], is lower
than the best DVQKD reported throughput, which uses a
1-GHz clock rate [26]. However, we predict (see Table II)
that reasonable improvements of the CVQKD hardware would
result in throughputs higher than those of DVQKD in distances
up to 30 km.
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